Stowaway issues

SINGAPORE

Stowaway regulations

Ships prior to their arrival must declare the presence of stowaways onboard to the Singapore Authorities. On arrival, the ship must proceed to the quarantine anchorage for immigration and port formalities clearance where the master will have to sign a bond of US$10,000 for each stowaway.

The authority will enforce these bonds if the stowaways are found missing from the ship prior to the departure clearance. The ship must therefore ensure that the stowaways are kept locked onboard during the entire port stay. Ships whilst at the quarantine anchorage are not allowed to carry out cargo operations and/or receive stores or bunkers. To perform these operations, the ship must shift from the quarantine anchorage to a proper berth or anchorage after the immigration and port formalities have been completed.

We advise all Members to be fully aware of the above and to inform their chartering and operations departments accordingly.

BRAZIL

Stowaways from African ports

The Club has been made aware of several cases concerning stowaways hiding in ship's rudder housings, specifically with ships coming from African ports in ballast to load sugar in Brazil. Stowaways have apparently discovered that the void space around the rudder stock is the best place to hide from the local stowaway search, since this place is not easily accessible from inside the ship.

Crews should be instructed on this new stowaway strategy, intensifying the stowaway search to include the rudder housing. Crew may have access to the rudder housing by opening any of the available accesses in the steering gear room.

One case involved a Member's ship, which was on a regular run between Djibouti and Yanbu al Bahr, Saudi Arabia. The ship was of conventional construction, but with a peculiarity in the rudder area which the stowaways could make good use of. On arrival at Jeddah anchorage where the ship called for bunkers, a stowaway was found sitting on top of the rudder assembly. This stowaway was a Kenyan national, who had entered the rudder cavity in Djibouti and had travelled for two days in the cavity, less than two metres above the water line with the noise of the propeller and steering gear constantly in his ears. When discovered, the stowaway was barely conscious.

As the stowaway had no documentation with him, and due to difficulties in repatriating stowaways from Saudi Arabia, the stowaway returned with the ship to Djibouti, where temporary travel documentation was obtained to allow for his repatriation. Prior to again sailing from Djibouti, the master requested a search of the rudder cavity. A mooring boat from the Port Harbour Office was used for the inspection, with a crewmember climbing into the rudder housing to check and confirm the space empty.

In other cases of stowaways being discovered in the rudder housing, they were found to be in very poor health and in one case two stowaways were unfortunately found dead.

We advise all Members of this situation and recommend that crews intensify stowaway searches and ensure that hard to reach positions on the ship, like the rudder housing, are thoroughly searched.

MOMBASA - KENYA

Problems with disembarking stowaways

A recent decree, issued by the Kenyan authorities, states that non-Kenyan stowaways are no longer permitted to be disembarked and be placed in the safe custody of the Mombasa Port Police pending investigation and eventual repatriation.

Non-Kenyan stowaways may only be disembarked when a consular/embassy official has confirmed their nationality and the requisite emergency travel documents have been issued. The stowaways will then be disembarked and taken directly to the airport. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to have necessary repatriation documentation on hand in time.

Most embassies are situated in Nairobi. Even if the officials manage to coincide their arrival in Mombasa with the arrival of the ship, the necessary flight schedules and seats may not be available for the stowaways to be transferred directly from the port to the airport. In some exceptional cases, Tanzanian stowaways can be removed in time, as the Tanzanian consular representative is located in Mombasa.

DURBAN - SOUTH AFRICA

Stowaways - ISPS Code

To disembark stowaways in Durban, South Africa, the following requirements must now be in place:

• Ships arriving in Durban from a foreign port are required to give 96 hours notice of stowaways onboard providing the ship is ISPS compliant. If the ship is not compliant with the ISPS code then this could hinder the disembarkation of stowaways.
• Ships arriving at Durban whose last port of call was a South African port, will be allowed to disembark stowaways without giving notice provided that they meet with the National Ports Authority's requirements.
• Ships arriving at Durban Roads from a South African port that wish to disembark stowaways at the outer anchorage will be allowed to do so, provided they meet with the National Ports Authority's requirements.
• Ships leaving Durban harbour where stowaways are found onboard after the ship has left the anchorage will be allowed to disembark the stowaways, provided they meet with the National Ports Authority's requirements.

In all cases where stowaways have been found onboard a ship from either a foreign port or a South African port, a pre-arrival form from the National Ports Authority of South Africa must be completed by the ship's local agent and forwarded, prior to the stowaway or stowaways disembarkation, to:
1. Maritime Rescue Coordinating Centre, Cape Town
2. Durban Port Control
3. Port Security Officer, Durban

We advise Members of the above requirements, which may be subject to changes, and also advise that local immigration requirements must also be complied with.

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WEST COAST USA

Reoccurrence of Chinese stowaways

Towards the end of May 2004, two entered vessels, a container and bulk carrier arrived at Long Beach, California and Vancouver, Canada respectively. Each had sailed from Busan, Korea, around the middle of May, one from the main container terminal and the second from Pier 5, bulk cargo, which is adjacent to the terminal.

During the voyage to Long Beach on the container vessel, three Chinese stowaways, all originating from Fujian, were found hiding in the deck container stack area. There was no evidence of any crew involvement in secreting the stowaways aboard and it was suspected that they had gained access during the vessel's stay in Busan.

In the case of the bulk carrier, seven Fujianese stowaways were discovered hiding in a void space below the forecastle and above the fore peak tank. In this case, they alleged that crew had assisted them to gain access to the vessel.

During the course of investigations it transpired that a third non-club entered vessel had also been found in Long Beach to have four Fujianese stowaways aboard, again hiding in above-deck container stacks.

In this instance, no evidence was present that the crew had assisted them and similarly the vessel had sailed from Busan during the same period.

From enquiries and debriefing of the stowaways, it appears that Korean Nationals in Busan provided help and, in some cases, the stowaways had been housed in Busan pending the discovery of a suitable vessel.

Fortunately, there is no suggestion that the stowaways had gained entry to containers and the most likely explanation is that they boarded the vessel at a time when the gangway was unattended. Certainly in respect of the non-club related incident, four Chinese were allowed onboard the vessel in the company of two Korean Nationals, who alleged that they were from owners. No evidence existed of them having left the vessel.

It is obviously important that owners and operators provide training and adequate supervision to those crew members responsible for vessel security in ports, although within increasing numbers of crew members, providing adequate cover becomes increasingly difficult.

If crew are not adequate to cater for this obligation, then consideration should be given to recruiting a security officer to supplement vessel security whilst in port. Certainly, Members should afford renewed attention whenever vessels are calling at this terminal.