Port State Control

Current News & Campaigns:
Now that the main principles of the New Inspection Regime (NIR) have been agreed, the Paris MoU is continuing its work to fill in the details of a new approach to port State control. While low-risk ships will be rewarded with a 24 month interval, the high risk ships will be subject to a more rigorous inspection regime with an inspection every 6 months. During 2006 the discussion on the NIR had to take into account what happened at the European Community level on the proposed recast Directive on port State control.

Work has also started on the details of the NIR and a Task Force is preparing proposals for the level and scope of inspections. These inspection matrices should provide a more harmonized approach to the levels to which different ship types are inspected. This would then also provide more accurate data on the results of the inspections and the level of responsibility. A new element in the NIR will measure the performance of the company of the ships. It is anticipated that the European decision making process will be finalized by the end of 2007. This would mean that the NIR will enter into force in 2010 or 2011 at the latest.

With Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta joining the Memorandum in 2006, the 25 members of the agreement have carried out 21,566 inspections in 2006. For the first time in 6 years, the number of detentions has gone up from 944 in 2005 to 1,174 in 2006. Given the fact that the freight market is very good, old tonnage may stay in service longer that planned. This could have an adverse effect on the safety of older ships. The relatively low costs of repairs following a detention do not outweigh high profits of carrying cargo. Hopefully this rise in detentions is not the start of a trend.

On the other hand a decreasing number of ships have been refused access to ports in the region. In 2006 a total of 14 ships were banned, compared to 28 in 2005, thereby bringing the total number of ships banned between 2004 and 2006 to 77. Research has indicated that most of these unwanted ships are still in operation in other areas, mostly in the Black Sea.

The decisions taken by Ministers during the 2nd Joint Ministerial Conference of the Paris and Tokyo MoUs in 2004 have been considered for implementation by the Paris and Tokyo Memoranda. A joint list of actions was agreed in 2005 and work programmes have been started for implementation. The intensified co-operation between the 2 regions has already resulted in harmonised procedures and joint inspection campaigns.

With the enlargement of the European Union, the Paris MoU will also extend its membership in the near future closing some blanks in the geographical scope. There are 2 more co-operating members who are undergoing an assessment in order to achieve full membership status. Working together with these countries, Bulgaria and Romania has been very successful.

From 1 February to 30 April 2006 a Concentrated Inspection Campaign was carried out in the context of MARPOL 73/78, Annex I, Regulations 16 and 17. The purpose was to investigate the operability of oil filtering equipment systems, and to find out whether sludge has been discharged into port reception facilities, burnt in an incinerator or in an auxiliary boiler suitable for burning oil residues, mixed with fuel or other alternative arrangements. Of most concern was a finding that in 108 cases unauthorized by-passes were found in the engine room. Such by-passes would allow oil residues to be pumped overboard directly, without being filtered. During the campaign 4,614 vessels were checked and of them 128 were detained (2.8%).

The seventeenth meeting of the port state control committee - September 2007
The Committee adopted a new set of amendments to the Memorandum which includes clearer and higher qualitative criteria for membership. The amendments will take effect in May 2008. The Committee also adopted a guidance document concerning application, assessment and acceptance of Co-operating Member Authority.

The Committee noted that the joint concentrated inspection campaign (CIC) on the ISM Code with the Paris MOU has been started. The Committee agreed that, upon completion of the campaign, a press release will be issued to inform the industry of the outcome and findings of the CIC. Furthermore, the Committee considered the relevant preparation and arrangements for the CIC on safety of Navigation (SOLAS Chapter V) in 2008 and the CIC on lifeboats in 2009. Same as the undergoing ISM CIC, both the campaigns will be conducted in
co-operation with the Paris MOU.

The Committee discussed matters relating to analysis of PSC statistics and, revision and harmonization of PSC coding system. The Committee considered the request from IMO inviting PSC regimes to provide PSC data to the global integrated shipping information system (GISIS). The Committee expressed the general support for provision of Tokyo MOU PSC data to GISIS.

Current News & Campaigns:
View the US Coast Guard Port State Control homepage for the safety and security targeting matrix. The homepage also lists charterers, ship management, class society, and flag states targeted by the USCG. A detention decision can be appealed under the provisions of Title 46 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 1.03

In developing its risk assessment methodology, the Coast Guard first recognized that three entities directly influence a vessel's operational condition and compliance with international safety and environmental protection standards. These entities are: 1) Ship Management, 2) Classification societies and 3) Flag States. If any of these entities fails to fully undertake its responsibilities for a ship's safe operation, then the ship is likely to be considered a substandard vessel by the U.S.Coast Guard.

The Coast Guard's previous experience with a particular ship provides another indication of whether or not that vessel poses an unacceptable risk. In addition, ship type and ship age are good indicators of the risk a particular ship may pose to a port.

The Port State Control Safety and Environmental Protection Compliance Targeting Matrix enables the Coast Guard to rationally and systematically determine the probable risk posed by non-U.S. ships calling at U.S. ports. The matrix is used to decide which ships Port State Control Officers should exam on any given day, in any given port. Targeting points are assigned in each of the five columns and then summed for a total point score. This numerical score, along with other performance based factors, determines a ship's priority for examination.

Policy Letters
Click Here to view the Policy Letters issued to guide Port State Control Officers in their inspections to ensure ship compliance.

The fourteenth meeting of the port state control committee - September 2007
The Maritime Authorities from the countries member of the Agreement analyzed a wide range of subjects pertaining to maritime safety and security, concentrated inspection campaigns, as well as activities carried out by related international organizations and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU`s).

Among the important issues discussed during the event, we could highlight the following: harmonization of the coding system with those used by other regional control regimes; updating and development of the new website of the Agreement (for both public and restricted access); information exchange with other MOU`s, with Lloyd`s Register Fairplay (LRF) and EQUASIS; Concentrated Inspection Campaigns; and enhancement of training for qualified officers from the Maritime Authorities.

In accordance with the decision of the Port State Control Committee, the concentrated inspection campaign (CIC) on the ISM Code in the Black Sea region was conducted from 01 September till 30 November 2007 under coordination of the Russian Federation.

Within the campaign the Black Sea MOU Authorities verified vital points of implementation of ISM Code requirements on seagoing ships, that is, effectiveness of SMS reflected in crew routine and emergency procedures, ship technical maintenance.

For the purpose of interregional harmonization of the action the Black Sea MOU used the model of relevant Questionnaire developed by Paris and Tokyo MOUs.

Totally during the campaign the Black Sea MOU Authorities conducted 922 inspections. In average, 40% of all individual ships entered ports of Black Sea MOU were inspected within the frame of the CIC. Deficiencies were found on about 15% of inspected ships, 35 vessels were detained.

The most number of inspections was conducted over the ships flying the flags of Panama (121 inspections); Turkey (109 inspections); Malta (100 inspections); Liberia (56 inspections); Georgia (46 inspections), and Cambodia (44 inspections).

The most deficiency percentages were recorded on the ships flying the flags of Syrian Arabic Republic (67%); Sierra Leone (40%); Cambodia (34%); Panama (23%); Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (23%).

In general, 45% of all inspected ships were of general dry cargo type, 23% -bulk carriers, 14% -oil tankers. Accordingly, maximum deficiency percentage was recorded on dry cargoes (67%), then bulk curriers (18%) and oil tankers (6%), ro-ro cargo ships and container ships (2.11%), gas carriers and chemical tankers (1.4%), combination carriers and passenger ships and ro-ro passenger ships (0.7). Majority between detentions belonged to general dry cargo ships (86%), and then went chemical tankers (6%), oil tankers and bulk carriers and container ships (3%).

The most problematic area at the ships inspected during the campaign was effective maintenance of the safety management system. About 40% of all deficiencies recorded applied to the issues of maintenance system and about 10% of all ships inspected had such deficiencies.

In general, 5% of inspected ships did not carry out review of SMS and at next 5% SMS routine procedures were not duly performed and recorded. At 3% of all inspected ships procedures for establishing and maintaining contacts with shore management in emergency case were not tested.

Initial analysis of the CIC confirms effectiveness of the ISM requirements and general proper understanding of the system by crews and shipowners. At the same time it should be noted that in many cases the system is still implemented just formally, continuous daily maintenance of it requires more attention from shore and ship personnel.

Detailed results of the campaign will be discussed during the next meeting of the Black Sea MOU Port State Control Committee in April 2008.

An FIC was conducted by AMSA Surveyors from 01st March to 31st May. These inspections were conducted in conjunction with regular PSC inspections.

The campaign focus was decided upon due to an increase in accidents, including fatalities, noted by AMSA as having occurred both Internationally and in Australia during mooring operations and general deck work.

The aim of the campaign was primarily to raise awareness of safety issues relating to mooring equipment and procedures, although PSC action could still be taken where issues were noted that required immediate attention.

AMSA also endeavoured to encourage operators to critically assess the level of maintenance of mooring equipment in order to ensure its continuing fitness for use. This is particularly relevant when utilising harbour tugs that have varying capacities that may impact upon the ship arrangements.

The inspections referenced MSC.Circ 1175 extensively, which is a document giving guidelines for implementing the new regulations of SOLAS Chapter II-I Regulation 3 created by MSC Resolution 194(80). These new regulations apply only to vessels newly constructed after 01st January 2007 - but the majority of the provisions are easily implemented by older vessels and were presented as “best practice” during the campaign.


AMSA surveyors inspected 747 vessels during the course of the campaign and recorded 62 deficiencies on 36 vessels; none of which warranted a vessels detention.

The FIC found that:

About 5% of ships did not have established procedures for mooring operations and/or handling tugs and less than 1% of ships that did have procedures, did not follow them.

About 2.5% of ships were identified with deficiencies with mooring equipment almost all of which were a lack of the recommended SWL markings.

From the FIC findings it would appear that a lack of operational procedures tended to be the predominant problem.

The PSC inspections carried out during the FIC period showed that about 2.5% of vessels had deficiencies with winches/windlasses related to maintenance of equipment.

A detailed summary of this, and all previous focused inspection campaigns can be found on the AMSA website.