

UK P&I CLUB



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LOOKOUT

Navigating the complex world of P&I insurance for Japanese Members

Avoiding fishing vessels at sea

“A collision can ruin your day”


Master/Pilot exchange

Gamification

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IS MANAGED
BY **THOMAS
MILLER**

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LOOKOUT


Lookout is a bi-annual newsletter from the UK P&I Club that collates the most relevant and topical content from across the Club's global network and shares it with our Japanese Members. It covers subjects such as people claims, loss prevention, defence and industry specific items.

The information in this newsletter is not legal advice and should not be relied upon as such.

THE AUTHORS

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Senior Loss Prevention Executive



George is ex Royal Navy with a certificate of competency equivalent to that achieved in the Merchant Navy and has extensive ship handling experience in a number of RN hull types. He is qualified as Company Security Officer, ISM, ISPS & ISO 14001 lead auditor and prior to joining UK Club was employed as deputy safety and security manager. He also completed a 6 month training contract in the London office with LS1 and Underwriting in 2013.

Articles: Avoiding fishing vessels at sea and Gamification

Captain David Nichol

Senior Loss Prevention Executive



David is a Master Mariner, joining Thomas Miller in June 2014. After leaving the sea, he became a claims manager with a Piraeus based P&I correspondent for two years before joining a marine surveying consultancy. In 1997, David established his own consultancy, with the majority of work being P&I related. From 2010 until joining Thomas Miller, he was a claims executive with another P&I Club, handling a wide variety of P&I and FD&D claims as well as being actively involved in their Loss Prevention initiatives.

Article: “A collision can ruin your day”

Stuart Edmonston

Loss Prevention Director



Stuart, a Master Mariner, joined Thomas Miller's Loss Prevention department in 2014. Prior to this he worked as casualty investigator for a leading shipping law firm and was at sea on a variety of different ship types including crude oil tankers, freight ferries, passenger ships and offshore drilling units, where he sailed as Barge Master.

Article: The Master/Pilot exchange

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Modern technology has, in many ways, contributed to increased safety in the shipping industry. Today, ships' bridges are equipped with an array of electronic devices, including ARPA, AIS and ECDIS. Yet, in spite of all the sophisticated gadgetry, 'collision at sea' remains one of the biggest risks to crew, property and the environment.



In one incident alone, the collision between the 164,000-dwt Sanchi (built 2008) and the 76,000-dwt CF Crystal (built 2011) claimed 32 seafarers' lives. After weather, groundings and fires or explosions, collisions are reported to be the fourth most common cause of ships' total losses.

An over-reliance on technology is often cited as being responsible for collisions. In other cases, the hazards of fatigue, distraction or simple human error are often identified and documented. As there is an increasing focus on crew safety at sea, what is evident is yet more can still and should be done in terms of training and keeping crews alert and safe from collisions.

In this edition of Lookout, we examine the subject of collision avoidance from three key aspects. Firstly, George Devereese, Senior Loss Prevention Executive, highlights the wider problem involving navigation close to fishing vessels and gives some helpful guidance for Masters and their Bridge teams. Secondly, David Nichol, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club, assesses the lessons learnt from two reported collisions that were recently investigated by the UKMAIB. Thirdly, Stuart Edmonston, Loss Prevention Director at UK P&I Club, and Captain John Simpson, Director at Solis Marine, discuss the need for good Pilot-Bridge communications, which are essential as part of passage planning for the ship to operate safely, particularly



when piloting waters where hazards are at close range and reaction times are limited. It should be remembered that the presence of a pilot on board does not relieve the master or the crew of their responsibility for the safe navigation of the ship, and therefore, all members of the bridge team contribute to effective Bridge Resource Management.

Finally, in "Risk Ahoy", we discuss how "gamification" has developed and is now helping to raise risk awareness among seafarers and make the shipping industry a safer working environment.

We welcome any comments and discussion you wish to share with us on the topics covered here, which we hope you will find of interest and benefit. We would also be interested to hear from you on topics that you would like to read in future editions. You can email your suggestions to paul.sessions@thomasmiller.com ■

Masaki Oiwa
The Representative in Japan

Paul Sessions
UK P&I Club Regional Director for Japan

Avoiding fishing vessels at sea

George Devereese, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club, looks at reducing the risks of collisions with fishing vessels.

The modern Bridge of a cargo vessel is designed for ease of use by the Officer of the Watch (OOW). All equipment is forward facing, enabling a constant look out to be achieved at all times, however, recently the Club has seen a rise in the number of collisions with fishing vessels. To combat this trend the Club has produced a Risk Focus publication: *Reducing the Risk of Collisions with Fishing Vessels*, which aims to reacquaint the Officer of the Watch with the characteristics of the most common type of fishing vessels seen. The booklet also includes case studies of when incidents with fishing vessels occurred, which it is hoped will promote lively on board discussions for continued education.

The range of equipment that fishermen deploy to catch fish is almost as varied as the fish themselves, but there are a number of common fishing methods that are used. These methods, together with the lights and shapes that should be exhibited, the likely position of the gear in relation to the boat and typical fishing manoeuvres, are explained in detail in our Risk Focus. During the Passage Planning process, it may be worth contacting the vessel's local agent or the local harbourmaster, to enquire whether there are any particular fishing-related dangers to be considered when approaching a particular region or port. During calm weather, extra vigilance is required as this is the time when many small fishing vessels will go to sea.

The nature of fishing

- Fishing boats get their cargo at sea so their main focus is on catching fish
- Fishermen generally do not receive a wage, but are paid a share of the proceeds of the voyage
- Fishing vessels often operate with minimal crew

- Fishermen are sometimes poorly qualified
- Fishing vessels often do not show correct lights or day shapes
- Fishing vessels often operate in channels and harbour approaches



How things should be

The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972) (“COLREGS”) specify lights or daytime signals that should be shown by fishing vessels engaged in different types of fishing, and which vessels have right of way under differing circumstances. The term “vessel engaged in fishing” means any vessel fishing with nets, lines, trawls or other fishing apparatus which restrict manoeuvrability, but does not include a vessel fishing with trolling lines or other fishing apparatus which does not restrict manoeuvrability.

In general, both sailing boats and power driven vessels should give way to vessels engaged in fishing. Exceptions to this rule include:

- A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any other vessel navigating within a narrow channel or fairway

- For Traffic Separation Zones:

- A vessel engaged in fishing shall not impede the passage of any vessel following a traffic lane
- A vessel other than a crossing vessel or a vessel joining or leaving a lane, shall not normally enter a separation zone or cross a separation line, except to engage in fishing within a separation zone

- A vessel engaged in fishing when underway shall, so far as possible, keep out of the way of:

- A vessel not under command
- A vessel restricted in her ability to manoeuvre

How things often are

Although the COLREGS should technically apply to all vessels of all Member States, they are very often overlooked or ignored. On small vessels in some regions of the world, it is common to have an unqualified skipper and crew who know little about safe navigation. Remember, many of these fishermen are poor, ill-educated and desperate to make a living. Safety is often a secondary concern.

What you may encounter is a number of unlit or poorly lit small vessels, with no radar reflectors, no lookout, gear stretching out to an unknown distance and unknown direction, and working close to or within the confines of a channel or harbour approach.

Fishing methods and gear

Following are some examples of the type of vessels that may be encountered. A more exhaustive list is included in the full Risk Focus publication – ‘Reducing the Risk of Collisions with Fishing Vessels’, available to download from the UK P&I Club’s website.



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Mobile or towed gear

This category includes, among others, trawls and dredges. The primary characteristic is that the gear is dragged through the water and is not attached to the sea bed.

Main safety issues

- Manoeuvrability is restricted during all parts of the operation
- Vessel should display a green light over a white light
- Gear is generally astern of the vessel
- Safe passing distance (astern) is at least 250m and may be more for a large vessel





Encircling gear

These methods rely on surrounding the fish either with a wall of netting which is then closed at the bottom and hauled in (purse seining), or with ropes that herd the fish across the sea bed towards the net that scoops them up (anchor seining, fly dragging).

Main safety issues

- Manoeuvrability is restricted during all parts of the operation
- Vessel should display alternately flashing yellow lights
- Safe passing distance is at least 500m from the vessel and may be more for a large vessel




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Passive mobile gear

Here the gear is mobile but is not towed by engine power, but drifts with the tide or wind. This category includes drift nets, surface longlines and squid jigging. These gears may extend very long distances from the boat.

Main safety issues

- Manoeuvrability is restricted during all parts of the operation
- Vessel should display a red light over a white light
- Gear may extend on the surface for very long distances from the vessel
- Gear will usually be astern of the vessel while being set and ahead of the vessel when being hauled




Fixed or static gear

These types of gear are generally fixed to the seabed by anchors. They rely either on bait to attract the fish to the gear (hook and line, pots and traps), or on fish becoming entangled in the mesh of the nets (gill nets or tangle nets). These gears may extend very long distances from the boat.

Main safety issues

- Manoeuvrability is restricted during all parts of the operation
- Vessel should display a red light over a white light
- Gear will usually be astern of the vessel, while being set and ahead of the vessel when being hauled
- Vessel may move unpredictably and quickly between sets of gear
- Most of the length of the gear will be underwater; however, buoy ropes may extend a considerable distance aft when the gear is being set



“A collision can ruin your day”

David Nichol, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club discusses the lessons to be learnt from two collision cases investigated by the UK MAIB.

The recent collision in the East China Sea between the tanker SANCHI and bulk carrier CF Crystal serves as a stark reminder that despite perceived improvements in ship design, technology and crew training standards, ship collisions continue to occur with relentless regularity.

The old saying “a collision can ruin your day” is, of course, a deliberate understatement for an event that can have tragic and far reaching consequences, not least in terms of tragic loss of life but also environmental pollution, loss or damage to ship and cargo, which in turn may involve very costly salvage or wreck removal operations. In attempting to gauge the scale of the problem, it is instructive to consider that of the high value pool claims notified within the International Group of P&I Clubs during the 2017 policy year, navigation related incidents predominate, and include a number of high profile ship on ship collisions.

Furthermore, a recent report by the insurer Allianz, cites that in terms of the leading causes of notified shipping incidents during the period 2007 to 2016, ship collisions rank second only to machinery damage¹.

It is, therefore, apparent that collisions constitute a significant proportion of marine casualties, and the reasons for this are not necessarily difficult to identify. Ships operate in a very challenging environment in terms of weather and increasing traffic densities in the world’s shipping lanes. They are an assembly of complex systems and machinery, which can malfunction and continue to be under the control of human beings who are prone to making mistakes, no matter how well trained or experienced they may be. However, it is broadly accepted that the root cause of the great majority of incidents can be attributed to human error and the following case studies provide a graphic illustration of this.

Collision between bulk carrier “A” and refrigerated cargo vessel “B”²

This collision occurred in the early morning hours in open water, good visibility and in light traffic conditions. Leading up to the collision, the bulk carrier “A” was proceeding on a heading of 104 degrees at 11 knots with the Officer of the Watch (OOW) assisted by an ordinary seaman (OS) at lookout. The cargo vessel “B” was on a course of 041 degrees at 19.5 knots with the OOW on the bridge as sole watch-keeper and lookout. At about 0515 hours, the OS on bulk carrier “A” reported sighting a vessel just forward of the starboard beam (cargo vessel “B”) and the OOW determined that it was an overtaking vessel and would pass about three or four cables clear of the starboard side. This assumption was made despite the OOW not plotting the other vessel on the radar or taking visual bearings. The OS continued to point out the



¹ Allianz Safety and Shipping Review 2017: http://www.agcs.allianz.com/assets/PDFs/Reports/AGCS_Safety_Shipping_Review_2017.pdf

² <https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-bulk-carrier-seagate-and-refrigerated-cargo-vessel-timor-stream-off-the-dominican-republic>

presence of the other vessel until finally shouting at the OOW to 'do something'.

It was only then that the OOW realised that collision was imminent with insufficient time to take effective avoiding action. The OOW on the bridge of cargo vessel "B" first saw the bulk carrier "A" only when it was very close on the port bow at a time when it was also too late to take any avoiding action prior to the collision.

At about 0540, the bow of cargo vessel "B" struck the starboard aft side of bulk carrier "A" in way of the engine room and accommodation with both vessels sustaining serious damage. Fortunately there were no injuries to crew although there was oil pollution from ruptured tanks in the flooded engine room of bulk carrier "A".

Both watch-keeping officers involved were very experienced and appropriately qualified and yet both failed to comply with the most basic requirements of keeping a safe navigational watch. The OOW of bulk carrier "A" upon being alerted to the presence of another vessel took no steps to determine if risk of collision existed but instead made a completely erroneous assumption as to the other vessel's course and relative movement. The OOW of cargo vessel

"B" should not have been sole lookout at night and evidently failed to maintain a proper lookout visually or by radar. Poor watch-keeping standards, driven by complacency, led to the collision. Those in charge of the navigational watch on both vessels failed to keep a proper lookout, did not assess the risk of, or take appropriate action to avoid collision. In summary, both officers failed to comply with some of the most fundamental elements of the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and the written navigational procedures issued by their respective company managers.

Collision between cargo ship "C" and a tug and tow in the Dover Strait³

The cargo ship "C" was transiting the south-west bound traffic lane in the Dover Strait Traffic Separation Scheme on the early morning 0000 to 0400 watch. The vessel was making good a course of 233 degrees at 15 knots in conditions of good visibility and a moderate to rough sea. At this time, cargo ship "C" was overtaking a tug towing an unmanned crane barge, with a tow line about 250 m in length. The OOW on the bridge of cargo ship "C" saw the lights being displayed by the

tug at close range very fine on the cargo ship's port bow and in response altered his vessel's course to port with the intention of passing the tug on its port side. At the time of the alteration of course, the cargo ship "C" was only two cables astern of the tug. Seconds later, the cargo ship collided with the towed crane barge and passed between the tug and the barge, catching the tow line as it did so. The tug immediately made a broadcast on the VHF radio warning the cargo ship that there was a wire and to slow down. However, the cargo ship proceeded to overtake the tug and with the towing line still snagged pulled the tug around 180 degrees causing it to be towed stern first at 14 knots. The tow wire was pulled from the winch drum and eventually broke free, leaving the barge adrift and the tug and its crew very lucky to have survived this very dangerous situation.

Investigation of the incident revealed a number of deficiencies with respect to the navigational watch-keeping on board the cargo ship "C". The OOW was seated in one of the navigating console chairs and appeared to be solely reliant on the AIS information transmitted by other vessels overlaid onto the ECDIS display on the console in front of him.



³ <https://www.gov.uk/maib-reports/collision-between-multipurpose-dry-cargo-vessel-rickmers-dubai-with-crane-barge-walcon-wizard-being-towed-by-tug-kingston-in-the-dover-strait-off-the-south-east-coast-of-england>

However, the tug was not transmitting an AIS signal as this equipment is not required to be carried on vessels under 300 grt. Irrespective of this, the tug and tow would have been clearly visible from the cargo ship and conspicuously indicated on the radar display well in advance of the collision which, had he been paying attention, would have enabled the OOW to take appropriate avoiding action in good time. The preserved VDR information revealed that the OOW had been largely inactive during his watch until the alteration of course. It was also determined that the designated additional lookout was not present on the bridge at this time, the Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm was switched off and music was being played on the bridge throughout the watch. There is no suggestion that the OOW was asleep or insufficiently rested but his evident lack of alertness had contributed to his failure to keep an effective lookout and make proper use of radar.

Although these two incidents involve quite different circumstances, they both share features which are commonly reported to have caused or contributed to ship collisions. Undoubtedly, the most important is the fundamental failure to keep a proper visual lookout and not making full and effective use of radar as well as other aids to navigation. All of these assets are not to be used in isolation as single means of navigating a vessel but instead should all be utilised together effectively and judiciously in order that the OOW may build up in this mind a full appraisal of the navigational situation and risk of collision. It is this situational awareness that enables the OOW to “look ahead” by anticipating potentially hazardous situations and to be able to promptly recognise and respond to changing circumstances. Traditional tried and tested navigational practice and new technology are not mutually exclusive but should instead complement each other. A good example of this is the use of AIS information for collision avoidance purposes which can provide useful heading and speed information for other vessels. As highlighted in the previous case studies, it is important that the OOW uses this information to supplement, not substitute, input from his own senses and radar. The essential



element of training and familiarisation in the proper use of navigational aids is to develop both a full understanding of their operational advantages and limitations. In the case of AIS, this would include OOW being aware of the fact that not all vessels may be fitted with or transmit AIS data and that such data may possibly be discrepant. Another recurrent issue in ship collision casualty reports is why otherwise well trained and experienced deck officers neglect good navigational practice or fail to observe established procedures? Frequently there is a disconnection between their behaviour and the high standards they would normally expect of themselves as well as the ship managers intentions for how the ship is to be run. The reasons for this may be varied and complex but often include complacency arising from a lack of motivation, boredom with the routine of watch-keeping, fatigue, becoming distracted with tasks not related to keeping a navigational watch, deficiencies in bridge resource management or even personal mental health issues affecting the performance of individuals.

Due to the nature of ship operations, shore side management have traditionally been largely reliant upon the master ensuring that standards of good navigational practice are maintained at a high level of efficiency. It is recognised that conducting navigational audits whilst a vessel is in port, as is usually the case, is no substitute for being able to assess the actual performance of the master and officers at sea. However, a more robust approach to monitoring performance could be to engage

professional navigational auditors as discrete sea riders as well as periodic scrutiny of VDR data. It is important that the reasons for inadequate performance are identified and that the necessary corrective action is taken, whether by way of improving procedures, additional crew training or addressing any issues with the personal welfare considerations of the persons involved. However ship managers should also be prepared to remove individuals assessed as incapable of performing to the required standard.

In the first case study, investigation of the incident was hampered to a degree by the master's failure on board one of the vessels to preserve the VDR data. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that masters and officers are fully familiarised with procedures for saving and retrieving this data which should be practiced on a regular basis. In addition, other items of navigational equipment also have electronic data storage which may be retrieved, including the ECDIS, AIS, NAVTEX and GPS. Collating this automatically generated data with additional evidence from witnesses and shore based vessel traffic service records will all contribute to constructing a full picture of the incident. Having this information fully accessible to marine investigators greatly assists in being able to determine what happened, not only with the aim of apportioning blame but also for the vital purpose of deriving important lessons to be learnt which may be shared within the fleet or the wider shipping community.

The Master/Pilot exchange

A joint study by UK P&I Club and Solis Marine Consultants found that 'human error' and particularly a breakdown of communications on the bridge is a major contributing factor in claims. **Stuart Edmonston**, Loss Prevention Director at UK P&I Club, and **Captain John Simpson**, Director at Solis Marine, examine the issues raised.

When the mandatory berth-to-berth passage plan for a voyage is being prepared, it is often the information that is needed to complete the transit, with the pilot onboard, to or from the berth, that is the most difficult to obtain in advance.

Even with the onboard sailing directions and port guides, together with what may have been provided by the local agent, there will still be areas where further detail is required by the bridge team.

There has been much discussion in the industry on the development of a port passage plan that can be provided to the master in advance of arrival, but it will be some time before it becomes standard practice, if ever. Every transit is different and the passage plan under pilotage must be considered a dynamic process and capable of being updated quickly as it is required.

There are times when the master may be asked to bring the vessel closer to the port entrance, perhaps due to bad weather, or because the pilot is still on the way. Whatever the reason, one of the first considerations must be to ensure that there is still adequate time for the master/pilot exchange to be carried out.

The master/pilot exchange is the missing piece of the passage plan puzzle and a crucial one.

Amongst other things, the bridge team will need to know the following:

Transit to and from the berth

- Route agreed with waypoints and courses, adequate charts
- Speed and timing for the transit
- Local weather and tidal conditions expected

- Vessel movements, any congestion off the berth
- Local traffic regulations
- Location of turning areas, including those needed for a berthing manoeuvre
- Abort points
- Emergency or standby anchorage areas

Tugs

- Number of tugs, their type and power?
- Time of arrival at the vessel?
- Where will the tugs be made fast?
- Ship's line or tug's line to be used?

The berth

- Any limitations such as the maximum/minimum size of vessel, number of bollards, fender capacity
- Turning areas are of sufficient size
- Mooring plan
- Any berthing speed limits
- Time required to order pilot/tugs in an emergency
- Departure procedures for letting go moorings

With the pilot onboard it is the opportunity for the master and bridge team to confirm arrangements and ensure that they are satisfied with the planned transit and berthing/unberthing manoeuvre. This is the first and best opportunity to talk to the pilot and to clarify any issues that have been identified during preparation of the onboard plan. However, it is important to prioritise this process, so that the limited time available at the start of the pilotage can be addressed directly and less urgent matters discussed once on route.

As far as is possible, the pilot needs to be part of the bridge team, not outside it, but also has to get on with the vital task of familiarising him/herself with the immediate situation, checking and setting radars, headings and speed and getting in contact with the port control, berth/terminal and tugs.

The co-operation of the master and bridge team includes confirmation of the language to be used throughout, so that helm and engine orders can be quickly and properly acknowledged and carried out.

The pilot will be familiar with most types of vessel and what to expect in ballast or loaded condition, however, no two ships behave in the same way, even sister vessels. It is, therefore, important to familiarise the pilot as quickly as possible with any manoeuvring features which might be unusual, vessel-specific or unexpected. It is also essential that the pilot is told immediately if there are any difficulties for the helmsman in maintaining the heading or delays with engine movements.

In the first instance, the pilot will want to confirm the draught of the vessel and the trim, as this will give him a first appreciation of how the vessel will be expected to respond to the wheel and what under keel clearance will be encountered on passage. For example, some vessels with even a slight trim by the head do not steer as easily as one on even keel or with stern trim.

An accurately completed pilot card gives the pilot all the essential basic information to build his own picture for the passage and any manoeuvres that will be carried out. It can then be supplemented in discussion with the master/bridge team.

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For the master, access to a local chart, perhaps due to recent changes in the port, additional hydrographic information or inadequate scale of the chart onboard may be a priority. With advance communication with the local agent, these are issues that can be resolved before arrival.

It should not take long to confirm the route to be taken, the areas of least depth, which might require a reduction in speed and positions where the vessel might be anchored in an emergency, or turned around if the passage has to be aborted. The pilot will need to know what squat to expect on passage.

If there are areas where the direction of the current is not in line with the channel and the bridge team is informed in advance, then they are prepared for what might appear to be unusual helm orders or courses to steer. This avoids unnecessary questions at what might be a critical part of the passage.

It is important that both the master and pilot are both clear about the status of the vessel and the planned passage. It is not the time to rely on assumptions, as expectations can be very different to reality.

However competent the pilot, the bridge team must monitor the progress of the vessel on the chart or ECDIS. A pilot

should never mind being asked questions about the position of the vessel in the channel or unexpected depth soundings.

During any pilotage transit, the anchors should be ready to be used in the shortest possible time. However, when there are tugs located at the bow it should never be forgotten to ensure that they are confirmed as being clear first, even in an emergency.

When tugs are to be used, the master must be satisfied that those provided have sufficient power to manoeuvre the vessel and also know what types they are. It is important to know when using more than one tug whether they are similar in their manoeuvring characteristics and have the same, or different, power.

The master should also consider whether ship's lines should be used to make the tugs fast. There are occasions where it might be necessary, but generally it is preferable to use the tug's equipment, particularly on larger vessels.

The instructions given to a tug by the pilot are often in a different language to that used onboard. It is up to the master to ensure that the pilot at least provides an overview of how the tugs will be used, without expecting a word by word translation of every conversation. If it feels like the speed of approaching the berth or going alongside is too high

it probably is, and those concerns should be passed to the pilot, so that action can be taken by using the engine and/or tugs moved into position to start to slow the vessel down.

Although the pilot is expected to be the local expert, it is possible that he/she might not have manoeuvred a vessel of the same type or size before. It cannot be assumed that the pilot knows everything, but the more that information is exchanged, the more effectively the transit and manoeuvre will be carried out. It should also be remembered that the pilot has not only gained personal knowledge and experience whilst working at the port, but also has access to that of all the other pilots and that is considerable back-up for any pilot.

The master should have information about the berth from the agent, however, the pilot should be able to provide more practical detail. That will include whether line handling boats will be used, which lines to be put ashore first, the configuration of the mooring lines and whether the anchor will be required.

During any pilotage transit, the key priorities are efficient and timely communication, in order to ensure a safe passage, and not to overload the bridge team and pilot with unnecessary information and questions.



“Gamification” – development in communication

Gamification is a way to add fun and competitiveness to a subject that might typically be difficult to communicate. **George Devereese**, Senior Loss Prevention Executive at UK P&I Club explains how this technique could be used to improve safety at sea.

When the Maritime Labour Convention was introduced in 2006 it made provisions that the access to ship-shore telephone, email and internet facilities at a reasonable charge were to be part of the responsibility of the ship operator. However, in the eleven years since the introduction of this convention there has been a quantum shift in the means by which people communicate and this change has been reflected in the modern seafarer’s approach to their contract.

In the 2015 Crew Connectivity Survey by Futureonautics Research 73% of respondents, of which there were over 3,050 from more than 30 countries, said the level of crew communication services provided onboard influenced their decisions about which shipping company they worked for. The communication type that was most desired by seafarers was free internet access, receiving 70%.

The primary reason for wanting free internet access was to enable the use of video chat services between crew members and their family and friends. When asked what their preferred means of accessing communications services was the majority of crew members picked mobile phones.

With such resources becoming more and more commonplace ship operators are responding to the wishes of their crew in providing greater access aboard their vessels. It would appear we are now entering a new age where communication to seafarers is no longer via the shore side office, but directly to the seafarer through such media as LinkedIn, Snapchat, Twitter and WhatsApp.

If ship operators could provide one free service, what should it be?




- Free satellite television 4%
- Free video chat 11%
- Other 1%
- Free email 7%
- Free voice calls 7%
- Free internet access 70%

By working alongside what is already published from shore side and engaging with the seafarer by this rapidly emerging medium at the grassroots, is there a new and expanding way to influence training aboard vessels? By delivering media directly to the seafarer in a modern and appealing way can we as an industry disrupt ourselves into improving safety aboard vessels by using one of the tools that is often sighted as a major distraction aboard ships, the mobile phone?

Gamification is a word that entered modern parlance in 2003 but did not gain widespread usage until 2010 and now finally in 2017 it is starting to enter the maritime consciousness. Gamification is, among other things, a way for businesses to add fun and competitiveness to a subject matter that might typically be difficult to communicate to a chosen audience.

How do crew want access to communications?



COLLISION FOCUS

In 2012, Metro Trains in Melbourne launched “Dumb Ways to Die” to promote rail safety and have since said the campaign contributed to a more than 30% reduction in “near-miss” accidents.

With its dispersed employee base and long lines of management from ship to shore the maritime industry is uniquely placed to exploit the potential gamification offers. Companies already employ computer-based training and video-based learning to enhance the training experience received by its employees. Using games to supplement learning would help ensure the continued training of the industry’s personnel and bring awareness to topics that may otherwise seem dull and tedious.



It can also be seen as a cost-saving measure as a game will transcend language and cultural barriers and engage all ranks, removing the need for translation of documents, rank specific seminars, cost of printing documentation or the cost of transporting crew to a central location to receive a briefing.

As previously mentioned, major companies ashore have already adopted this style of training with much success and with a similar widespread network of employees spanning many countries. As such, the idea has a proven route to success which could easily be migrated to any shipping company using existing lines of communications, again reducing any inherent costs over and above the design of the game.


By utilising such emerging technologies and engaging with our seafarers, in a way that they have already stated is

important to them, we should be able to re-energise learning, awareness and communication within our industry and bring it into the 21st century.

With this in mind, the UK P&I Club Loss Prevention team has produced a mobile game app called “RISK AHOY!” which takes players through multiple levels of increasingly challenging difficulty, working through various mini games, while identifying and avoiding common on board hazards. The idea of the game is not as a teaching aid but to highlight common areas of risk which if not properly mitigated often lead to expensive claims for the shipowner.

By utilising this technology, it is hoped to promote a new level of engagement with the seafaring community, by adding social media sharing to the game it is envisaged that, like previously cited examples, it will go viral throughout the community and in a fun and novel way promote an understanding of some of the everyday risks that some may, by virtue of time, take for granted. For those new to the sea or considering a career at sea it could also serve to highlight some of the challenges of the various vessel types trading the world’s oceans.

By its very nature this is also a dynamic platform, where ideas and the very



technology on which it is founded does not stand still. This again is part of the rationale of using this medium, as new technologies and regulations enter the maritime environment it will be easy to update and modify the game to reflect these changes ensuring that the awareness it promotes remains current and at no additional cost to the end user. By moving into this new medium the UK Club is trying at a grass roots level to re-engage the seafarer with safety and an understanding of the importance of continued through contract education and skill set maintenance.

RISK AHOY! Think you've got what it takes to survive a life at sea?

Test your skills and powers of observation as you avoid the hazards, make decisions and maintain your ship.

Download the UK Club's Risk Ahoy! game for free.

UK P&I CLUB

THIS WAY UP

Available on the App Store

GET IT ON Google Play

Expertise and experience

P&I claims are often complex incidents involving a range of stakeholders from valued customers and trade partners to regulatory authorities. Quick and equitable resolution is key if those relationships are to be preserved. The Club's global network of local offices enables the delivery of Club service in a Member's own language and time zone. Our team are here to help you navigate the complex world of P&I insurance.

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
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Maritime Intelligence Portal

The Club's loss prevention team has been working with Geollect, the UK- and US-based Geospatial Intelligence Company, to provide Members with cutting edge data feeds with geospatial analysis, providing essential information on ports and locations across the globe. Members can access the portal here: www.ukpandi.com/loss-prevention/maritime-intelligence-portal/



GLOBAL NETWORK

